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Abstract 
 
In this article, I argue that securities fraud class actions (SFCAs) should not be 
treated as class actions but rather should be treated as derivative actions. In addition, I 
argue that such actions should be dismissed unless it appears that insiders (including the 
company itself) have enjoyed gains from trading during the fraud period. Both of these 
conclusions are based on the fundamental argument that (1) securities law seeks to 
protect the interests of reasonable investors, (2) reasonable investors diversify, and (3) 
diversified investors are effectively protected against the supposed financial harms of 
securities fraud by virtue of being diversified, except in cases in which insiders have 
extracted gains by trading during the fraud period. Only those actions that involve insider 
trading or the equivalent by directors, officers, or agents of the defendant company (or 
the company itself) entail genuine financial harm to the plaintiff class, because only those 
actions involve an extraction of wealth from the public market. Accordingly, only SFCAs 
that allege insider trading or the equivalent should survive a motion to dismiss.  
 
In addition to the fact that diversified investors suffer no compensable harm in the 
absence of insider trading or the equivalent – simple securities fraud -- SFCAs visit 
serious collateral damage on defendant companies, ultimately reducing investor return. In 
an action based on failure to disclose bad news, the prospect of payout will cause stock 
price to fall by more than it otherwise would -- even in a perfectly efficient market – and 
will trigger a positive feedback mechanism that will have the effect of magnifying the 
potential payout. This feedback effect can be quantified with precision using a simple 
formula. For example, in a case in which the release of bad news should cause market 
price to fall by 10 percent, the SFCA feedback effect will result in a price decline of 
about 20 percent if share turnover has been 50 percent during the fraud period. Thus, by 
their very nature SFCAs cause additional damage to defendant companies and 
stockholders. It is easy to fix the feedback problem. If the case does not involve insider 
extraction of gains, it should be dismissed. If the case does involve insider extraction of 
gains, it should be litigated in the name of the corporation, and the corporation should 
recover any gain extracted by insiders. Specifically, treating a securities fraud action as 
an action by the corporation (whether it is maintained by the corporation itself or 
derivatively by a representative stockholder) will make stockholders whole and will 
avoid collateral damage to the issuer corporation.  
 
Finally, the argument here suggests a new rationale for why insider trading should 
be illegal, namely, that it involves the extraction of wealth from the market and 
presumptively diversified investors. In turn, this suggests that diversified investors and 
largely undiversified insiders should be viewed as two different classes of investors with 
distinct interests. Thus, I also explore the public policy reasons for recognizing such a 
distinction and some of its other implications. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last ten years, nearly 2400 securities fraud class actions (SFCAs) have 
been filed against publicly traded companies in the United States.1 These actions have 
resulted in settlements of about $27 billion, and attorney fees of about $7 billion.2 More 
than one in fifty companies is the target of such an action each year.3 Yet for most 
investors these awards confer no economic benefit. Indeed, for conservative buy-and-
hold investors (the majority) they reduce investment returns.  
 
At best, an award from an SFCA is nothing more than an expensive 
rearrangement of wealth from one pocket to another (minus a cut for the lawyers). 
Diversified investors are equally likely to sell an overpriced stock as to buy one. For 
diversified investors, gains and losses wash out. On the other hand, SFCA awards 
constitute an unjustifiable transfer of wealth from conservative buy-and-hold investors to 
stock-picking traders. In addition, SFCAs visit serious collateral damage on defendant 
companies, ultimately reducing returns for conservative buy-and-hold investors. The 
prospect of payout by the defendant company causes stock price to fall by more than it 
otherwise would – even in a perfectly efficient market – and triggers a positive feedback 
mechanism that has the effect of magnifying the potential payout – sometimes with 
devastating effects. Indeed, about 30 percent of settling companies end up bankrupt.4
I argue here that a securities fraud class action should be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears that insiders (including the company itself) have enjoyed 
 
* Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. 
 
1 See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2005: A Year in Review, at 1. 
 
2 See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post Reform-Act Securities Settlements, 
2005 Review and Analysis, at 1; Anjan V. Thakor, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action 
Litigation (Navigant Consulting, October 26, 2005), Exhibit A (finding plaintiff attorney fees of $1.7 
billion in connection with settlements totaling $11.9 billion in a sample of 482 class actions). Assuming 
that this sample is representative of the percentage of settlement awarded as plaintiff attorney fees 
(approximately 14 percent in the sample), a good estimate of the total plaintiff attorney fees awarded in 
SFCAs since 1995 is $3.6 billion (14 percent of $26 billion). Assuming that defendant firms have been paid 
roughly the same amount, it seems a fair estimate that SFCAs have generated about $7 billion in attorney 
fees over the last ten years. To be sure, defendant firms are paid in all cases, whether or not the plaintiff 
prevails, but presumably defendant firm fees are a good deal less than plaintiff firm fees in cases in which 
plaintiffs prevail. Note that plaintiff attorney fees are paid out of the settlement and that accordingly the 
estimated amount available for investors was $26 billion less $3.6 billion or about $22.4 billion. 
 
3 See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2005: A Year in Review, at 4. 
 
4 See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post Reform-Act Securities Settlements, 
2005 Review and Analysis, at 14  
 
3gains from trading during the fraud period. Only those actions that involve insider trading 
or the equivalent by directors, officers, or agents of the defendant company (or the 
company itself) entail genuine financial harm to the plaintiff class, because only those 
actions involve an extraction of wealth from the public market. If the case does not 
involve insider extraction of gains, it should be dismissed. No harm, no foul. If the case 
does involve insider extraction of gains, it should be litigated in the name of the 
corporation, and the corporation should recover any gain extracted by insiders. 
Specifically, treating a securities fraud action as an action by the corporation (whether it 
is maintained by the corporation itself or derivatively by a representative stockholder) 
will make stockholders whole and will avoid the collateral damage to the issuer 
corporation.  
 
The essential point can be well illustrated by an allegory. Imagine a crowded 
room in which everyone has $200 in one-dollar bills in his pocket. Dobby, the mostly 
invisible house elf of Harry Potter fame, scurries about the room randomly picking a 
single bill from the pocket of one individual and inserting it immediately into the pocket 
of another.5 How much would one pay to avoid the risk of ending up a dollar short at the 
end of the day? Not much. Even though a very speedy elf might redistribute hundreds of 
dollars, it is highly unlikely that any individual will end up much worse off in the end. 
Indeed, as a statistical matter, the most likely outcome is that one will end up precisely 
where one starts – with $200. And it is almost impossible that one would end up more 
than a couple of dollars short or long. Thus, for an individual to pay even a dollar for elf 
insurance would likely cost more than the harm. Now suppose that a few folks in the 
room have two $100 bills in their pockets. If the elf’s practice is to lift a single bill at a 
time from any one individual, an individual with two $100 bills would likely be worried 
enough to buy elf insurance. Although the odds remain even that one will end up even, 
the risk that one will lose $100 or even $200 is much greater. But there is a cheap and 
easy way to avoid the risk: An individual can protect himself by getting change and 
holding only singles. 
 
Accordingly, a diversified investor (one who can lose only a dollar from any 
single fraud) should not be too worried about securities fraud, whereas an undiversified 
investor (one who can lose half his wealth from a single fraud) will be very worried about 
it. Indeed, undiversified investors might favor hiring a securities guard (so to speak) with 
sophisticated elf detection equipment. They might even favor taxing all investors to pay 
for protection. On the other hand, diversified investors would be opposed to any such tax 
for the same reason that they would decline to buy elf insurance. They would argue that 
undiversified investors should simply get change for their big bills and stop worrying. 
 
5 This allegory was inspired by a presentation made by Joseph Grundfest at the University of Maryland 
School of Law several years ago. Easterbrook and Fischel use a similar though slightly less apt example 
involving Robin Hood. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 U. Chicago L. Rev. 611, 622 (1985).  Those familiar with Harry Potter books will recognize Dobby as 
the house elf featured therein. 
4But suppose that Dobby keeps every second dollar for himself. Even a diversified 
investor would worry a bit in such circumstances, because a speedy elf might subtract 
wealth from the aggregate in the room. Although even a diversified investor would favor 
some form of protection in such circumstances, a diversified investor would only be 
willing to pay for protection focused on cases in which the elf keeps the money. 
Protection that extends to mere redistribution among investors would still be seen as a 
waste of money. 
 
This allegory illustrates a fundamental problem with SFCAs. There is an inherent 
conflict between diversified and undiversified investors. Although undiversified investors 
may see a need for SFCAs, diversified investors should be opposed to SFCAs as a 
deadweight loss except in situations in which an insider has kept some of the money by 
trading on withheld information.  
 
A second fundamental problem with SFCAs is that the defendant company pays 
the damages. As a result, the value of the defendant company is reduced by the amount of 
the payout in addition to any decline in the stock price of the company that results from 
disclosure of new information. Moreover, in a bad news case, this reduction in value 
itself results in a further decline in stock price and sets up a positive feedback mechanism 
that can lead to a total decline in price that may be several times the decline that would 
have resulted simply from the disclosure of negative information. For diversified 
investors, this additional loss is a significant cost over and above the expenses of 
litigation. These costs confer few benefits. Although they may afford some amount of 
deterrence, they do nothing to recoup the gains extracted by elfin insiders, but they do 
significant harm to defendant companies and thus to portfolio returns. 
 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how SFCAs arise, how damages 
are calculated under current law, and why the current approach leads to several problems. 
Part II explains portfolio diversification, how it can protect stockholders from the effects 
of securities fraud in the absence of insider trading or the equivalent (simple securities 
fraud), and why securities law in this area should presume that stockholders are 
diversified. Part III discusses securities fraud accompanied by insider trading or the 
equivalent, why diversification cannot fully protect stockholders in such circumstances, 
and how feedback distorts both awards and the market itself. Part IV shows how treating 
securities fraud as a claim belonging to the issuer company can solve the problems 
inherent in SFCAs and why the courts should treat SFCAs as derivative actions. Part V 
addresses how such a solution might be implemented. Finally, Part VI discusses some of 
the broader implications of viewing securities fraud essentially as a problem of insider 
trading. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
SFCAs usually arise from the failure of a publicly traded company to disclose 
material information in a timely fashion. The information itself may be either good news 
or bad news. In other words, a securities fraud action may be triggered by news that 
causes the price of a stock to rise (in which case those who sold during the fraud period 
5suffer harm) or by news that causes the price of a stock to fall (in which case those who 
bought during the fraud period suffer harm). There are notable examples of both types of 
fraud.6 But bad news fraud is far more common because of the way damages are awarded 
in securities fraud class actions as I explain in detail below. Thus, the discussion here is 
based generally on the premise that securities fraud involves the failure to disclose bad
news in a timely way. 
In a bad news case, the plaintiff class consists of all who purchased the stock in 
question after an actionable misrepresentation or omission and who hold the stock until 
some time after corrective disclosure.7 The standard approach to damages in a bad news 
case is to award the difference between the price paid by the buyer and the market price 
after corrective disclosure.8
6 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (good news); Time Warner Securities Litigation, 9
F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993) (bad news). There are, of course, many other forms of securities fraud, ranging 
from those arising in face-to-face dealings to those arising in connection with corporate level 
mismanagement, but these other actions are seldom amenable to pursuit as class actions. In other words, 
SFCAs invariably arise as a result of an issuer's failure to disclose material information to the market in a 
timely fashion. 
 
7 Some may quibble with this characterization in that it can be unclear exactly when the truth comes out. 
See Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3478 
(holding that loss causation may be proved by evidence that a stock was overpriced as a result of false 
statements or omissions at the time of purchase even though the price did not fall with corrective 
disclosure). See generally Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis & James R. Banko, Securities Fraud, 
Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 
59 Bus. Law. 1419 (2004). Nevertheless, no one seems to deny that the price of the stock must decline for 
some reason after the plaintiff purchases, and most would likely agree that the decline must somehow be 
tied to the original failure of disclosure. Thus, for convenience, I will assume here that a prototypical SFCA 
involves a prolonged failure of disclosure followed by a corrective disclosure by which the whole truth 
comes out all at once and with no interim leakage. I should note that I do not distinguish here between 
misrepresentations and omissions. Both are generally actionable, although there are subtle differences in 
the relevant law. Compare Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), with 
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). In practice, most securities fraud class actions arise from 
some combination of the two. For example, a company might issue a press release or periodic report that is 
correct at the time of release. The press release then becomes false or misleading as a result of intervening 
events, but the company then fails to issue another release to correct the lingering false impression. See In 
Re Time Warner Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
8 This approach to calculating damages can be traced back to Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 
F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976), and it is the formulation upon which Congress relied in connection with the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 at 42. Although this 
is a common description of the measure of damages, and may well be applied in some cases, it is a gross 
oversimplification. For example, factors other than fraud may have affected market price before corrective 
disclosure, or the truth may dribble out. See Richard A. Booth, Windfall Awards Under PSLRA, 59 Bus. 
Law. 1043 (2004); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1487, 1490-92 (1996); Michael Y. Scudder, The Implications of Market-Based Damages Caps in 
Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 435 (1997). Of course, most SFCAs are settled if they are not 
dismissed. Thus, it is unusual for damages ever to be awarded by a court. Nevertheless, the putative 
measure of damages will affect settlement negotiations. Moreover, given that the settlement of a class 
action must be approved by the court, the court itself may well consider the parties’ assumptions and 
estimates as to damages. Accordingly, I use the more neutral word award to refer herein to both damages 
and settlements. 
6It is well known that there are serious problems with this measure of damages.  
 
First, although it is easy to calculate damages if there is a single plaintiff, the 
calculation of aggregate damages has proved to be exceedingly difficult in the context of 
a class action. Many shares may be bought and sold repeatedly during the fraud period. 
Trading volume during the fraud period is likely to be many times the number of 
damaged shares. The problem is that there is no way to determine how many different 
shares traded during the fraud period short of sending out claim forms.9 This intractable 
problem has led to serious uncertainty in the context of settlement negotiations. It has 
also led to the invention of several suspect trading models designed to estimate aggregate 
damages that have been characterized as junk statistics by some commentators.10 
Second, most investors are diversified and as a result are effectively protected 
against simple securities fraud -- securities fraud in the absence of insider trading or the 
equivalent. Simple securities fraud is a zero-sum event. For every buyer-loser there is a 
seller-winner. Buyers and sellers in the aggregate neither gain nor lose.11 A diversified 
investor is equally likely to be on the winning side of a given trade as on the losing side. 
A diversified investor who owns 200 to 300 different stocks with a modest turnover of 
about 60 percent per year (as is the case with a typical mutual fund) is likely to see gains 
and losses that are roughly equal over the course of a few years. Thus, a diversified 
 
9 See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421, 
1427 (1994); Kenneth R. Cone & James E. Laurence, How Accurate are Estimates of Aggregate Damages 
in Securities Fraud Cases? 49 Bus. Law. 505 (1994). For example, suppose that a company has a public 
float of 10 million shares and annual trading volume of 15 million shares. The fraud period is one year. 
And the largest single trade during that period is a block trade of 100,000 shares that occurs on the first day 
of the fraud period. It is theoretically possible that the 100,000 shares could be bought and sold 150 times 
during the year (in trades of varying sizes), accounting for the entire volume of trading. It is also possible 
that as many as 10 million different shares were sold during the fraud period. Assuming that damages are 
(say) $5 per share, aggregate damages could range from $500,000 to $50 million. Unless the context 
requires otherwise, I use the word investor to include all investors -- regardless of whether they buy and 
hold for long periods or trade often. Although many commentators distinguish between investors and 
traders, the position I advocate here does not require any such distinction.  
 
10 Again, one could wait until after trial -- when class members submit claim forms -- to calculate damages. 
See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487 
(1996); Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by 
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56 Bus. Law. 483 (2001). But the vast majority of SFCAs 
settle before trial. In order to settle, the parties must determine a settlement amount. Moreover, in a class 
action, the court must approve the settlement and the amount of plaintiff attorney fees, which is typically 
based on the settlement amount. Thus, a court cannot avoid involving itself in the calculation of damages 
even if the case does settle. The role of the court is thus somewhat unusual, given that the issue of damages 
arises in the context of the parties’ joint submission of a negotiated settlement agreement in a proceeding 
that is not clearly governed by the rules of evidence, which makes the use of dubious trading models all the 
more worrisome. 
 
11 To be sure, all investors lose when bad news is announced and stock price falls. But this is a loss that all 
would suffer anyway -- fraud or no fraud. Thus, a shareholder who avoids a loss effectively enjoys a gain. 
 
7investor is already effectively protected against securities fraud in most cases.12 To be 
sure, some investors may not be diversified. But it is irrational for passive investors not to 
diversify. Through diversification, an investor can avoid significant company-specific 
risk without any reduction in return and can do so at no cost. Because it is irrational to 
assume more risk than necessary, it follows that rational investors diversify. On the other 
hand, even diversified investors in the aggregate may lose if the fraud involves inside 
transactions by which wealth is transferred out of the public market. If the fraud involves 
nothing more than the failure to disclose material information in a timely fashion, there is 
no effect on aggregate stockholder wealth. Gainers equal losers. But if the fraud is 
accompanied by insider selling before bad news is announced, wealth is transferred out of 
the public market to the extent of insider gain (or loss avoided). A rational approach to 
damages should be based on the effect of securities fraud on diversified investors.13 It 
should distinguish between cases in which investors suffer no genuine harm and cases in 
which the market is harmed by inside transactions. 
 
Third, the company pays the damages.14 Accordingly, the prospect of the SFCA 
award itself causes the market price of the stock to fall by an additional amount on top of 
the amount by which it fell as a direct result of the corrective disclosure. That additional 
decrease in price will cause an increase in damages, which in turn will cause a further 
decrease in price. In the case of bad news fraud, SFCAs trigger a positive feedback 
mechanism that magnifies the decrease in market price -- and the potential award to 
plaintiffs – sometimes by several multiples of the decrease that would have occurred as a 
simple result of the disclosure of new information in the absence of the threat of a class 
action.15 Feedback will arise even in a perfectly efficient market. To be sure, the market 
may over-react to bad news and may fall by more than it should. But overreaction is 
beside the point for present purposes. The point is that even if the market is working 
perfectly, feedback magnifies damages. Feedback is inherent in the class action system. 
Indeed, the prospect of a significant payout by the issuing company may often cause 
 
12 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 
1496 -1502 (1996). Investors may be diversified at various levels. Obviously, investors who invest through 
mutual funds are very well diversified. Studies indicate, however, that an investor who holds at least 20 
different stocks can gain almost all of the benefits of diversification. 
 
13 One might say that investors are the cheaper cost avoiders for securities fraud. See Frank H. Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. Chicago L. Rev. 611 (1985).  
 
14 The award goes to those who bought or sold during the class period at the expense of longer term 
investors who did not trade during the fraud period. Because SFCA award are paid by defendant 
companies, the award is paid in effect by the stockholders of the defendant company. See, e.g., Donald C. 
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639 (1996). Even if a 
large part of the award is paid by accountants or attorneys or other agents or insurance companies, 
presumably, these costs are ultimately borne by the company, through higher professional fees and 
insurance premiums, although such costs may be spread through the market. 
 
15 Feedback works in the opposite way in a good news case, where the prospect of payout by the defendant 
company triggers a negative feedback mechanism that has the effect of muting the increase in stock price 
that one would expect on the basis of fundamentals. This explains why bad news cases are far more 
common than good news cases. 
 
8more of the price decline than the fraud itself. As I explain below, the positive feedback 
mechanism reaches a mathematical limit that depends on the number of shares traded 
during the class period. The larger the number of shares traded, the greater the potential 
award. Thus, It is no surprise that plaintiff attorneys favor cases with long class periods.16 
The implications of diversification and feedback taken together are striking. 
Diversified investors suffer no harm from securities fraud except in those cases in which 
insider trading subtracts wealth from the market. Even then the transfer is likely to be 
miniscule. But the feedback effect means that the market price of a defendant company 
stock in a bad news case will fall by more – sometimes much more – than it should. The 
net effect is that SFCAs are a wash for diversified investors. On the other hand, defendant 
companies see their stock price fall by more than it should, and they are thus deprived of 
the capital to which they would have access in a market undistorted by SFCAs. In short, 
SFCAs do no apparent good for anyone (other than lawyers), but they do considerable 
harm to defendant companies. 
 
The foregoing problems could be avoided altogether if the courts were to treat 
securities fraud claims as belonging to the company rather than to the stockholders. If the 
fraud does not involve insider trading, there is no harm to diversified stockholders in the 
aggregate and no award is necessary. If the fraud does involve insider trading, investors 
are fully compensated if the company recovers the insider gain. Because the company 
recovers, such an approach avoids the problem of feedback, and it eliminates the need to 
determine the number of damaged shares. To be sure, this solution requires the company 
to sue insiders who may have engaged in improper trading. But if the company fails to 
sue, stockholders can maintain a derivative action. 
 
The focus here is on securities fraud not involving an offering by the issuer 
company. Obviously, if the company has sold stock fraudulently, it makes no sense for 
the company to recover. The appropriate remedy is for the company to give back the 
money. And that is essentially the remedy under the 1933 Act. But it is also clear that 
 
16 Commentators have suggested several other possible reasons for the preponderance of bad news cases. 
First, it seems more likely that management will seek to hide bad news than to hide good news. Moreover, 
management is likely to be less fearful of the consequences of hiding bad news if the company is on the 
verge of collapse anyway. See Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theories and Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691. Some commentators have also 
suggested that the market overreacts to bad news. See Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the 
Stock Market Overreact? 40 J. Fin. 793 (1985); Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Further 
Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557 (1987). Whether or not 
that is true, it is clear that the market discounts the value of the subject company not only for the bad news 
itself but also for the prospective payout. See also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in 
Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421 (1994). Although most commentators who have focused 
on the issue have simply noted the fact that the prospect of SFCA damages causes a stock’s price to fall 
more than it otherwise would on the basis of new (negative) information (what might be called the 
fundamental decline), some commentators have attempted to measure the difference or crash component of 
stock price decline by calculating and netting out the theoretical price to which a stock should decline on 
the basis of the information disclosed. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-
5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7 (1994). 
 
9under the 1933 Act the total award is limited to the amount of the offering.17 
Accordingly, there is no possibility of feedback in a simple 1933 Act case.18 
II. SIMPLE SECURITIES FRAUD 
 
In a civil action, one must allege and prove compensable harm in order to state a 
claim and ultimately recover.19 In the absence of a credible allegation of financial harm to 
the plaintiff or class proximately caused by securities fraud, presumably the case should 
be dismissed.20 In most SFCAs, diversified investors as a group suffer no financial harm 
as a direct result of the fraud. A simple SFCA -- one based on an allegation that agents of 
the defendant company misled the market and not involving financial gain to the 
company or its agents (simple securities fraud) -- is a zero sum event. For every investor 
who buys and suffers a loss, there is another investor who sells and effectively enjoys a 
gain (by avoiding a loss). Gains equal losses among traders. In short, most securities 
fraud class actions amount to a zero-sum redistribution of wealth.21 
17 Securities Act §11(g). See Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing 
need to trace shares to offering). 
 
18 It is common in actions under the 1933 Act for the plaintiff also to include a claim based on Rule 10b-5. 
A Rule 10b-5 claim is superfluous in connection with an IPO, but in connection with subsequent offerings, 
a Rule 10b-5 claim has the effect of joining additional class members who bought shares that were already 
outstanding. In such a case, the feedback created by the Rule 10b-5 claim will have the effect of enhancing 
claims under the 1933 Act as well. If Rule 10b-5 claims are seen as claims in the name of the company, as I 
propose here, it seems unlikely that they will be pleaded in connection with claims under the 1933 Act. 
 
19 See generally FRCP 12(b)(6) (providing for motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted). The requirement of monetary damage in connection with a violation of federal 
securities law is implicit in the requirement that the plaintiff prove loss causation, as codified by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA): "in any private action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this title caused 
the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000). See Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3478. See also Suez 
Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001). See generally Jay W. 
Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis, and James R. Banko, Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss 
Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 Bus. Law. 1419 (2004). 
Moreover, both the 1933 Act §11(g) and the 1934 Act §28(a) expressly prohibit recovery in excess of 
actual damages. Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) 
(both requiring some element of financial gain to support tipper breach of duty in connection with charges 
of insider trading); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that only traders 
have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 and thus suggesting that the plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action must 
demonstrate a realized monetary loss). 
 
20 In the context of a class action, it is arguable that the representative plaintiff must also allege that the 
class has suffered financial harm as a class. In other words, it is not enough that the individual plaintiff 
allege that he or she has been harmed. This requirement would also seem to be implicit in the requirements 
that common questions predominate and that the representative be an adequate representative of class 
interests. Given that most stock is held in diversified portfolios, it seems clear that an undiversified plaintiff 
cannot be an adequate class representative. But a diversified plaintiff arguably suffers no loss and cannot 
serve as a representative either.  
 
21 The aggregate value of a company’s shares is the same after the disclosure of bad news whether the 
disclosure is timely or not although the identity of the investors may differ. In other words, there is no 
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A diversified investor is equally likely to be on the winning side of a trade as on 
the losing side. To be sure, a diversified investor may still suffer harm from an individual 
trade. But for a diversified investor with many different portfolio stocks, the harm is 
likely to be small. More important, gains and losses will net out over time.22 Such 
investors are fully protected from simple securities fraud through diversification. They 
need no remedy.23 
Admittedly, an undiversified investor may suffer significant harm from securities 
fraud. An investor who forgoes the benefits of diversification and picks a single stock can 
lose her entire investment. But it does not follow that an undiversified investor should 
have a remedy if she voluntarily assumes the unnecessary risk that goes with failure to 
 
direct social cost. Non-traders may suffer paper losses. But they would have suffered such losses earlier 
anyway even in the absence of fraud. In any event, it is well settled that non-traders have no standing to 
sue. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 
22 This is particularly true of investors who invest through mutual funds and other institutional vehicles. 
Such funds typically invest in 200 to 300 different stocks. And 62 percent of all stocks (by dollar amount) 
are held by institutions. See Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 1173 (2002). The number is 
probably much higher because individual holdings include holdings by non profit institutions. On the other 
hand, nonprofits include some pension plans which may be undiversified. As Julian Velasco has pointed 
out, there may be an intergenerational conflict that affects the analysis. For example, it is likely that a 
younger investor who follows a rational buy-and-hold strategy and who is therefore a net buyer would 
suffer disproportionately from bad news fraud (fraud that results in overpricing). Such an investor might 
not sell as often he buys. Still such an investor will sell with some frequency because of the need 
periodically to rebalance his portfolio, or, if the account is taxable, in order to net out gainers and losers. 
The question is whether purchases outweigh sales. Moreover, as the investor ages and becomes a net seller, 
the bias reverses. But that may not be enough to overcome the time-value of earlier lost returns. The more 
important question is whether investors gain enough from SFCAs when they are members of a plaintiff 
class to make up for the losses they suffer when they are non-trading holders of the stock of a target 
company, especially under a system in which a significant  amount of the award goes to the lawyers. In 
addition, one must consider the added risk from positive feedback in bad news cases. Those who have 
invested in companies that become targets of SFCAs lose more than they should when they are holders of 
such stocks, while they are merely made whole (less their share of attorney fees) when they are a member 
of the plaintiff class in a successful SFCA. As a result, investing is riskier than it needs to be. 
 
23 See  Anjan V. Thakor, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation (Navigant Consulting, 
October 26, 2005). The Thakor study included 2596 large institutional investors who traded in 476 
securities that were the subject of class action settlements between December 22, 1995 and August 25, 
2005 and found (based on modest assumptions about the timing of trades during fund reporting periods) 
that the institutions suffered losses of  $43.8 billion and gains of $30.7 billion in the affected securities for a 
net loss of $13.1 billion before settlement.  Interestingly, the institutions' share of settlement proceeds in 
these cases was $11.9 billion (less $1.7 billion in attorney fees) for a net loss before attorney fees of just 
$1.2 billion. The Thakor study also found evidence that the pre-settlement losses were attributable to new 
issues of securities during the fraud period. Specifically, $1.5 billion in loss was attributable to IPOs and 
$10.6 billion in loss was attributable to the half of the non IPO cases involving issuers who were relative 
net sellers of stock. Just $1.0 billion in loss was attributable to the half of cases involving companies 
classified as non-issuers. (It is unclear why the study divided the remaining cases in half rather than 
according to whether the isuer was in fact a net seller or net buyer during the class period.) 
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diversify. Again, it is irrational for a passive investor not to diversify. And securities law 
is protects only reasonable investors.24 
A.  The Presumption of Investor Diversification 
 
Rational investors diversify. Through diversification an investor can eliminate the 
risk that goes with investing in a single stock without any sacrifice of expected return.25 
Studies indicate that one can eliminate more than 99% of company-specific risk with a 
portfolio of as few as twenty stocks. And with 200 to 300 stocks all company-specific 
risk is gone.26 The only risk that remains is market risk -- the risk that the market as a 
whole will rise or fall.  
 
Moreover, investors have no real choice but to diversify. The fact that company-
specific risk can be avoided means that the market sets the price of individual securities 
as if no such risk exists.27 To see why, suppose that market prices did reflect company-
specific risk. Portfolio investors would buy up securities -- which would be underpriced 
from their point of view -- and hold them in portfolios that eliminate company-specific 
risk. The price of stocks would rise and eliminate any return attributable to company-
specific risk. Undiversified investors would then be forced to pay higher prices for 
individual stocks even though the return remained the same. In other words, an investor 
who buys a single stock as a stand-alone investment takes more risk than is necessary to 
achieve the expected return from that single stock. Such behavior in an investor who is 
able to diversify is irrational by definition, because the fundamental goal of investing is 
to generate the greatest possible return at the lowest possible risk.  
 
Finally, it is virtually costless to diversify. Although it might at first seem as if 
only the very wealthy can afford to hold as many as 200 or 300 stocks, complete 
diversification is available very cheaply through mutual funds for investors with as little 
as $1000 to invest.28 In short, it is so cheap and easy for investors to diversify that it is 
 
24 See TSC v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Denying a remedy to undiversified investors creates an 
added incentive to diversify. Thus, it may be more accurate to characterize the effect as eliminating a 
subsidy for undiversified investors. On the other hand, many courts have permitted action against trustees 
for losses on imprudent investments even though the losses are more than offset by gains from other 
investments and even though trust law requires diversification. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 213 
(1959). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Investor 
Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52 (1987) (criticizing the so-called anti-netting rule). 
 
25 As a result, a diversified investor is risk-neutral. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 29-30. This 
is not to say that a diversified investor is indifferent to risk. Rather, a diversified investor will prefer that 
management of any individual company pursue the highest risk-adjusted return even at the risk of the ruin 
of the company. 
 
26 See JAMES H. LORIE, ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 21-24 (2d ed. 1985).   
 
27 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 193-209 (4th ed. 1985). 
 
28 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS § 15.2 (1998). 
To be sure, many funds impose sales charges of various sorts. But there are also many that do not. One 
must also consider the management fees and other charges paid by the fund itself. On the other hand, funds 
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simply unnecessary for investors to take company-specific risk. There is no downside to 
diversification.29 Accordingly, a rational investor must diversify. By the same token, it is 
fair to say that it is irrational for an investor who can do so not to diversify.  
 
B. The Implications of Investor Diversification 
 
If federal securities law is intended to protect reasonable investors, then it would 
seem to follow that investors should be presumed to be diversified.30 Even if one is 
reluctant to deny a remedy to undiversified investors, it is undeniable that there is a 
fundamental conflict of interests between diversified and undiversified investors.31 The 
two groups have distinctly different preferences. The law cannot serve both groups. If 
there is a need to choose, the choice is clear. The law should presume that a reasonable 
investor is a diversified investor.  
 
A diversified investor is not merely indifferent to SFCAs. Rather, a diversified 
investor should be positively opposed to any effort by other investors to prosecute such 
actions. For a diversified investor -- who is effectively insured against loss from simple 
securities fraud -- the costs associated with SFCAs result in a net loss of portfolio return 
even after adding in the proceeds from awards. It seems clear that the interests of 
diversified investors should trump the interests of undiversified investors where the two 
come into conflict.  
 
C. The Limits of Investor Diversification 
 
There are several possible responses to the foregoing arguments. First, one might 
argue that stockholders diversify in order to eliminate the risk of bad management and 
that securities fraud is a different sort of risk involving dishonesty rather than honest bad 
judgment. But there is more than one form of securities fraud. Some nondisclosures are 
prompted by a legitimate business purpose. For example, a company may want to 
maintain secrecy during the course of product development in order to avoid competition 
 
are able to command very low commission rates in connection with trades. Thus, in the end it is unlikely 
that even a wealthy investor can invest more cheaply than through a mutual fund. 
 
29 In addition, diversification (in conjunction with the efficient market) relieves the investor of the need to 
engage in costly research. As for those investors who choose to invest on their own, an investor who buys 
20 round lots of different stocks will typically pay about the same commission or spread in total as an 
investor who buys 2000 shares of a single stock. 
 
30 One might even say that federal securities law should ignore the interests of undiversified investors just 
as the definition of materiality ignores the interests of stockholders who merely might be interested in the 
disclosure of a particular item of information. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 
(1976). 
 
31 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 
1506 (1996). 
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and maximize return.32 On the other hand, some nondisclosures are designed to facilitate 
improper trading by insiders or the company itself before the market is fully informed. 
Both forms of fraud are equally actionable under federal securities law.33 
The risk of the former – simple securities fraud – is a risk like any other ordinary 
business risk. Sometimes you win and sometimes you lose, but it all comes out in the 
wash. Securities fraud merely rearranges existing wealth. Investors can avoid the harms 
associated with securities fraud through diversification. Hence, there is no reason for a 
diversified investor to sue as long as all other investors decline to sue. On the other hand, 
if some investors sue, then all investors must do the same -- a classic market failure. 
Thus, diversified investors will favor a rule that prohibits legal action in such 
circumstances, because the cost of the action is a deadweight loss to the system.  
 
The risk of fraud with insider trading is different. Fraud with insider trading 
constitutes a net loss to investors in the aggregate.34 Gainers do not cancel out losers 
because insiders extract some of the gain. The public market loses to the extent that 
insiders have extracted wealth. Diversification provides complete protection only in a 
simple securities fraud case. In a case of fraud with insider trading, the perpetrators 
extract some of the gain that would otherwise go to innocent traders. That loss is a loss to 
the system. In other words, simple securities fraud is a zero sum game. But securities 
fraud with insider trading is a negative sum game.35 Even diversified investors will 
 
32 See Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 
Stan. L. Rev. 87, 100 (1999). 
 
33 To be sure, a plaintiff must plead and prove scienter in order to recover for securities fraud under Rule 
10b-5. But scienter involves only some level of knowingness. It does not necessarily involve a bad motive. 
Although I suggest here that cases not involving some form of insider trading should be dismissed, it would 
accomplish a similar result for the courts to winnow cases according to the motive for non-disclosure. To 
some extent the courts have done so. See Time Warner Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). But 
it appears that the courts have become less inclined to do so following the enactment of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and in particular § 21D thereof. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 
300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
34 This assumes of course that one views the fraudster as an outsider. In most cases, however, the fraudster 
is also a stockholder. There may be situations in which it is appropriate to allow a fraudster to keep the 
proceeds. Indeed, Henry Manne has made a career of arguing as much. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, 
Options? Nah. Try Insider Trading., Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2002 at A8. One possibility is to limit 
actions to those who could have made or participated in the decision to disclose the information on the 
theory that they must have delayed disclosure in order to trade. In other words, an insider who is in no 
position to disclose the information publicly should not be forced to sit idly by and miss an opportunity to 
trade. Incidentally, it is unclear that there are any situations other than insider trading coupled with power 
to delay disclosure that would amount to fraud. 
 
35 The distinction is the same as that between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty under corporation law. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the ultimate justification for the business judgment rule may be that 
stockholders can diversify away the risk of bad judgment but not the risk of theft. See Richard A. Booth, 
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 
Bus. Law. 429 (1998). As for bad judgment, some risky business decisions pay off, while others do not. 
Only the average matters. Assuming that the potential returns from risky business decisions are adequate to 
justify the risk -- that the decisions are made in good faith -- and that the stockholder is well diversified, 
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recognize that there is a need for some sort of remedy in such cases. But the SFCA is a 
singularly bad remedy as I discuss further below. 
 
Second, it might be argued that some stockholders cannot diversify and may need 
the protections afforded by SFCAs. Three classes of stockholders come to mind: (1) 
stockholders who own shares in a closely held corporation, (2) large investors who have 
or seek control over the issuer, and (3) employee stockholders who may be precluded 
from selling their shares even though a public market exists. 
 
As for stockholders in closely held corporations, it is unclear that federal 
securities law – which is focused on public offerings and public trading – should apply, 
although it is well-established that it does.36 Nevertheless, such cases are unproblematic 
for present purposes, because few if any are likely to give rise to a class action. On the 
contrary, it is likely that the victim of a fraud will almost always have an action against 
the buyer or seller on the other side of the trade (including the corporation itself). A state 
law fiduciary duty claim will also be available in many cases. As for a large investor who 
has or seeks control over the issuer, any such investor is free to pursue an individual 
action.37 
The one class of potential plaintiffs that is truly troubling is the class of 
employees who have been induced to invest discretionary funds in an undiversified 
retirement plan such as appears to have occurred at Enron. As for employee stockholders 
precluded from trading, they will seldom have a federal cause of action anyway precisely 
because they cannot trade. Only buyers and sellers may sue. Thus, if an employee 
 
then the winners will make up for the losers. But it is unlikely in a self-dealing case that the corporation 
will gain from a transaction with a conflicted director or officer. In other words, there is seldom if ever the 
potential for a big upside to a duty of loyalty problem. Diversification works on the law of averages. If the 
universe of outcomes is breakeven at best, with possible losses from dishonesty, the average outcome will 
be a loss. Diversification may cushion the blow, but it cannot eliminate the loss as it does with good faith 
business decisions where a big return on one long shot makes up for a big loss on another. Thus, one can 
overcome the business judgment rule by showing that a corporation entered into a no-win transaction. See 
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. 1940). 
Arguably, the business judgment rule might not apply in a world in which losses were more common than 
profits, but that is not the world we have -- at least not among publicly traded companies. It is worth noting 
that diversification protects an investor both as to the disclosure of new information and as to the 
underlying event itself. Indeed, securities fraud is arguably less worrisome than the risk of bad business 
judgment from which stockholders in the aggregate lose wealth. This also suggests that investors may not 
care much about company-specific information as long as it relates to a risk that can be diversified away. 
Cf. Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing significance of 
company-specific information). But the risk of insider trading or the equivalent, like the risk associated 
with a duty of loyalty claim, is a risk that cannot be diversified away. Indeed, in most cases, insider trading 
constitutesa a duty of loyalty claim. 
 
36 See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 
429 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 
37 Moreover, such an investor tends not to trade with much frequency and would not likely be a member of 
the plaintiff class. As for those justifiably undiversified investors who do in fact trade, the chances seem 
quite high that if they have in fact been defrauded, it will have been in a unique face-to-face transaction.  
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happens to buy or sell during the fraud period, the employee will presumably be included 
in any class action. Moreover, the fact that the employee was free to trade during the 
fraud period suggests that the employee was free to diversify. And one could argue that 
employees have even more reason to diversify because much of their human capital is 
tied up in the issuer-employer.38 On the other hand, such employees may have a cause of 
action against those who induced them to forgo diversification.39 But it may be that in 
many cases employees will be precluded from maintaining an action by ERISA.40 
If there are other classes of investors who are justifiably undiversified, the burden 
would seem to rest with the investor to explain why he or she forwent the benefits of 
diversification, which in turn would introduce individualized issues of proof that would 
likely preclude certification of the case as a class action. In short, it is not clear that 
justifiably undiversified investors have much need for the supposed protections afforded 
by SFCAs. 
 
Third, it may be argued that some investors are rationally undiversified, for 
example, NYSE specialists, NASDAQ market makers, and day-traders. Moreover, one 
might argue that these traders are very important to the market because they provide 
liquidity for other investors. But the fact that specialists and market makers focus on 
individual stocks does not necessarily imply that they are undiversified. Most market 
makers make a market in hundreds of stocks. And although specialist firms were 
 
38 Cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 364 U.S. 119 (1953) (noting that employee-investors are especially in 
need of accurate information). 
 
39 See generally Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to 
Measure Risk, 54 Bus. Law. 1599 (1999). See Robertson  v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Company, 47 
F.3d 1268 (3d Cir. 1995); Ehrlich v. First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 233-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1984). 
 
40 Yet another group of undiversified investors may be high level employees or agents or even directors 
who have been compensated with stock or options. It is unlikely that such investors will ever be so 
numerous as to need to resort to SFCAs and the circumstances of their sales will almost always preclude 
class certification. Many Enron employees were involuntarily undiversified, however, as are the employees 
of many other companies that fund their retirement plans with excessive amounts of company stock. But in 
most cases, the remedy, if any, is a matter of employment law as governed by ERISA and not of federal 
securities law. Moreover, it is arguable that plans funded primarily with company stock are more in the 
nature of profit-sharing plans than investment accounts. Although the employee-beneficiaries may have 
been misled or misinformed, there is nothing inherently wrong with a profit-sharing plan that ties the 
fortunes of the employee to those of the employer. I do not mean to suggest that undiversified investors 
should never have a remedy under federal securities law. Indeed, there are many situations in which they 
should have protection. An investor who buys a large block of stock with a view to exercising some control 
over the issuer is rationally undiversified and should have a remedy if defrauded. And a small investor 
whose broker or adviser fails to diversify the investor’s portfolio may well have a claim. See Richard A. 
Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to Measure Risk, 54 Bus. Law. 
1599 (1999). But such claims will seldom if ever give rise to a class action. Thus, my argument here is 
limited to SFCAs in which there is no privity between plaintiff and defendant and in which reliance is not 
an issue. See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 639 (1996); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1487 (1996).  
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traditionally individually owned and focused on the five or so stocks assigned to each 
individual specialist, today there are only a handful of specialist firms handling the 2500 
or so stocks traded on the NYSE. Clearly, market makers and specialist firms are 
diversified in the sense that the risk of fraud is spread over many stocks. Moreover, a 
market maker or specialist can in theory pursue those traders who trade on the basis of 
inside information. In other words, they do not need the supposed protection afforded by 
SFCAs.41 As for day traders, it is not at all clear that they are necessary to the market as a 
source of liquidity.42 Indeed, it appears that there is far less day trading going on today 
than there was at the height of the market in 2000. Yet the markets remain perfectly 
liquid. Moreover, to the extent that day traders remain a significant constituency to be 
considered in framing securities law, it seems clear that they have voluntarily forgone the 
benefits of diversification in favor of a risky strategy. 
 
Fourth, one might argue that precluding recovery for securities fraud on the 
grounds that rational shareholders diversify would eliminate an important mechanism by 
which companies are made to disclose material information to the market and that in the 
absence of such information the market would become less efficient and investing would 
become riskier. There are several responses. First, the fact that stockholders lack a 
remedy does not necessarily mean that issuers have no duty to disclose. Stockholder 
rights and management duties need not be symmetrical.43 The SEC can handle 
enforcement in egregious cases.44 Second, companies may do a better job of disclosure if 
they are not subject to hair-trigger lawsuits for mistakes.45 Presumably, the better a 
company does at disclosure, the less risky it is to invest in that company, and the higher 
the price of that company’s stock. In other words, the market provides plenty of natural 
 
41 Ironically, market makers have often been excluded from SFCAs at least for purposes of determining the 
number of damaged shares, because it is presumed that as in-and-out traders they suffer no harm. 
 
42 To the contrary, it has also been suggested that day traders may constitute a menace by creating unduly 
thin markets at many different price levels. In any event, it seems clear that the vast majority of trading can 
be traced to portfolio adjustments of various sorts by diversified investors and that relatively little trading is 
motivated by stock picking. See Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 713 (1995). See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market 
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Reply: Agreeing to Disagree 
over Excessive Trading, 81 Va. L. Rev. 751 (1995). 
 
43 See generally Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to 
Measure Risk, 54 Bus. Law. 1599 (1999). 
 
44 See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639 
(1996). See also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1999). 
 
45 In theory, this hypothesis could be tested by comparing the rate of voluntary disclosure before and after 
the adoption of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward looking disclosure. 
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incentive to disclose, other things being equal.46 SFCAs constitute a wildly excessive 
penalty for getting it wrong, and thus presumably create a disincentive to disclose. 
 
Fifth (and finally), it seems clear that investors in the aggregate and the market 
itself are harmed by securities fraud. Surely the fact that investors cannot trust the market 
to set accurate prices must have some adverse effects. But it is not at all clear how to 
measure the damage from loss of trust or confidence. One might argue that Enron and 
WorldCom damaged the market as a whole and not simply their own stockholders. But it 
is not clear that securities law does or should afford a remedy for such harms. Indeed, the 
fact that the market rises and falls from the waxing and waning of investor confidence is 
one of the inherent risks of investing.47 
In short, there is a fundamental conflict between diversified and undiversified 
stockholders. A diversified stockholder should be opposed ex ante to private actions for 
damages based on securities fraud unless it can be shown that the perpetrator extracted a 
gain from the fraud. Even then a diversified stockholder would favor a private action for 
damages only to the extent that it sought restitution from the perpetrator.48 A diversified 
stockholder is protected against simple securities fraud by being diversified. The cost to 
the company of defending against the private action is a deadweight loss. In other words, 
diversified stockholders are not merely indifferent to securities litigation. They should 
oppose it in principle.49 
46 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
Va. L. Rev. 669 (1984). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1984). 
 
47 It is also arguable that SFCAs do additional harm to the market generally by suggesting that the market is 
less trustworthy than it really is. If indeed there are many – or even a few – SFCAs that should be 
dismissed for lack of cognizable financial harm, it stands to reason that many investors will view such 
actions as evidence that the market is crooked. 
 
48 Diversified investors would likely also favor a rule that includes a penalty of some sort, such as treble 
damages, that would create additional deterrence as well as compensation in order to deal with problems of 
detection. This is essentially the idea behind the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) and the 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) both of which provide for 
disgorgement of gains and a penalty of three times that amount. See Securities Exchange Act § 21A. This 
should not be seen as a windfall to investors, but rather as a rough way of making them whole by affording 
compensation for undetected cases. 
 
49 It is ironic that the class action was touted as especially well suited to securities fraud cases. See Official 
Comment to FRCP 23. Interestingly, it appears that mutual funds and other institutional investors often 
forgo the opportunity to file claims in successful securities fraud class actions. See James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class 
Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 855, 855 (2002). Although one might be tempted to argue that this constitutes 
some kind of evidence that institutional investors have recognized that securities fraud class actions are 
counterproductive, the fact is that failure to file a claim when others file is irrational (irrespective of 
whether one favors SFCAs) and amounts to a subsidy running from funds to claimants. On the other hand, 
it may be that mutual fund investments tend to be concentrated in particular stocks and that failure to file a 
claim is more common in cases in which most other investors are also mutual funds, suggesting a form of 
consciously parallel behavior. See Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares? 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 883 (2002) (replying 
to Cox and Thomas). In any event, there has been a flurry of lawsuits recently against mutual funds that 
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III. FRAUD WITH INSIDER TRADING 
 
As noted above, diversification affords full protection only from zero-sum simple 
securities fraud. But some cases of securities fraud are non zero sum. If bad news fraud is 
accompanied by insider or company sales, there will be a net transfer of wealth from 
outside investors to insiders or the company. That is, if insiders sell on nonpublic bad 
news, outsiders who buy will lose. But not all of the gains will go to other outside 
investors who happen to sell. Some of the gains will go to insiders. In other words, 
outside investors as a class will be net losers as a result of the fraud. Similarly, outside 
investors may suffer a net loss if the company sells shares without disclosing bad news. 
And, in cases of good news fraud, outside investors will lose if insiders or the company 
buy stock or if the company grants stock options. To be sure, a diversified investor will 
be less concerned about the costs of fraud than an undiversified investor. But on the 
average and over time, even diversified investors lose from fraud with insider 
transactions, because some amount of capital is diverted from the public market to 
insiders. 
 
A. The True Measure of Damage 
 
It does not follow, however, that individual investors who happen to buy or sell 
during the fraud period should be able to recover the difference between trade price and 
post disclosure market price. In a market undistorted by the effects of SFCAs, most of the 
price difference will be attributable to new information about the company, and relatively 
little of the price difference will be the result of wealth extraction by insiders. In the 
absence of insider trading, market price will change when new information comes to 
light. Insider trading makes it change by a bit more or a bit less than it would. But for 
diversified investors that is the bit that matters. Thus, to permit investors who trade 
during the fraud period to recover the full difference between trade price and post 
disclosure market price is far too generous, because it compensates them for damage they 
did not suffer -- that part of the price change that would have occurred at some point 
anyway when the truth came out. The true measure of the loss to investors in the 
aggregate is the amount extracted by insiders.50 In a perfectly efficient market, market 
prices will be just a bit lower after such a fraud than they would have been in the absence 
of the fraud -- whether it is good news fraud or bad news fraud. In other words, the true 
damage to the market comes from something like dilution. The rather obvious remedy is 
for the perpetrators to disgorge their gains to the company. In a perfectly efficient market, 
disgorgement should have the effect of increasing market price by exactly the extra 
amount by which it fell from the fraud. Thus, a class action is the wrong way to fix the 
problem. An action by the company or a derivative action would do the job far better. 
 
failed to file claims in SFCAs. See Jonathan D. Glater, Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail to Collect in 
Settlements, New York Times, January 19, 2005 at C1. 
 
50 See Thakor at 16, note 10. 
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B. Feedback in Bad News Cases 
 
Aside from the fact that the standard approach to damages overcompensates 
diversified investors, a class action invariably does more harm than it does good, because 
the issuing company pays the award to the plaintiff class, reducing the aggregate value of 
the issuing company and its stock by the amount of the payment. Because of the feedback 
effect, that reduction may be several multiples of the loss that would have obtained from 
corrective disclosure in the absence of feedback. 
 
For example, suppose that Acme Corporation has ten million shares outstanding 
and that the current market price is $10 per share. The market capitalization of Acme is 
thus $100 million. Acme management learns that a key customer is about to cancel a 
major contract, which will have the effect of reducing profits by ten percent. 
Accordingly, the price of Acme stock is expected to fall to $9 per share. For some reason, 
management decides to withhold this information from the market for several months. 
During that period, six million Acme shares are traded. To avoid unnecessary 
complications, assume that during the fraud period there has been no leak of information 
or insider trading and that all of the six million shares traded are different shares that have 
been traded just once. When Acme finally discloses the bad news to the public, the price 
of its stock will fall by ten percent plus some amount that reflects the likelihood that 
Acme will become the target of an SFCA. Given that 60 percent of Acme shareholders 
bought during the fraud period and that the loss in value is one dollar per share, one 
would expect that the damages payable to the buyers will total $6 million. The problem is 
that if Acme pays out $6 million in damages, its aggregate value is further reduced by 
that amount, which in turn causes the market price to drop further, which in turn 
increases the per share damages. And so on. In other words, the process repeats itself 
through a positive feedback mechanism that causes the market price to fall a bit more 
with each iteration. The proverbial bottom line in this case is that if the market is working 
perfectly, the price will equilibrate at $7.50 per share. In other words, what should have 
been a 10 percent decline in price will have been magnified to become a 25 percent 
decline in price because of the prospect of SFCA damages.51 
One can calculate the total percentage decrease in market price in a bad news case 
using the following formula: 
 
total decrease in market value = expected decrease / (1 - % of shares damaged) 
 
Note that the formula makes it clear that the greater the percentage of shares damaged 
(the greater the turnover of different shares), the greater the total decrease in market price 
(and the greater the aggregate damages or settlement value). Indeed, in a case in which all 
of the shares have turned over, the total decrease in value is theoretically infinite. To be 
sure, a company cannot decline in value to less than zero. But SFCA damages can wipe 
out 100 percent of a company’s market capitalization even though some stockholders did 
 
51 For a more detailed derivation of the solution, see the appendix. 
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not trade. The following chart sets forth the results for Acme at various levels of 
turnover. A graph of these results follows in Appendix II. 
 
There are two distinct problems created by the feedback effect of SFCAs. First, it 
constitutes an excessive penalty against the defendant company. Indeed, in a simple 
SFCA there is no clear reason to penalize the company at all. The decrease in the value of 
its stock from the disclosure of the new information is probably penalty enough.52 
Second, SFCAs invariably result in the transfer of wealth from diversified buy-and-hold 
investors to undiversified stock-picking traders. Thus, SFCAs encourage irrational 
investment strategies. 53 In the case of bad news fraud, the award goes to some of the 
current shareholders who bought in at a too high price (thus redistributing wealth within 
the corporation from older to newer shareholders).54 
52 There are presumably two sources of decrease: (1) the decrease in price that results from the disclosure, 
and (2) some additional decrease in price that results from a loss of trust. The latter may be significant in 
that there are many investment opportunities for investors (who can move their money virtually costlessly) 
and who may easily avoid the defendant company in favor of other more trustworthy companies. Moreover, 
even a non-stock-picking diversified investor might chose to avoid investing in particular companies and 
nonetheless remain fully diversified. Thus, the market probably provides adequate deterrence for most 
disclosure problems. 
 
53 Investors are presumably marginally conscious of the fact that if they get cheated they will always have 
the prospect of recovery via SFCA. Thus, the current system subsidizes investment strategies that should be 
discouraged. 
 
54 Presumably the plaintiff class will include both undiversified investors and diversified investors who just 
happened to buy at the wrong time. In the case of good news fraud, the award goes entirely to former 
shareholders who sold out at too low a price. In both cases, the award will tend to go primarily to active 
traders rather than to buy and hold investors. To the extent that an award constitutes a mere rearrangement 
of capital within the market, it may not be too terribly worrisome. One might argue that investors in the 
aggregate (the market) are no worse off (but for attorney fees and other expenses of litigation). Presumably, 
BAD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES 
Assume hypothetical pre-damages decrease of $10M: 
 
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.5M or $1.25/share. 
 
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $6.67M or $1.67/share. 
 
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $10M or $2.00/share. 
 
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $15M or $2.50/share. 
 
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $40M or $5.00/share. 
 
If 90% of shares are damaged, total award is $100M or $10.00/share.* 
 
* Note that $100M is more than entire value of company at $9 per share. 
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C. Feedback in Good News Cases 
 
In a good news case, feedback has the opposite effect. Rather than magnifying the 
decrease in stock price, feedback in a good news case has the effect of dampening the 
increase in stock price.  
 
For example, suppose that Binford Corporation has ten million shares outstanding 
and that the current market price is $10 per share for a market capitalization of $100 
million. Binford management learns that a new customer is about to sign a major 
contract, which will have the effect of increasing profits by ten percent. The price of 
Binford stock is expected to rise to $11 per share. Again, management decides to 
withhold this information from the market. During the fraud period, six million different 
Binford shares are traded. When Binford Corporation finally discloses the good news to 
the public, the price of its stock will rise by ten percent less some amount that reflects the 
likelihood that Binford will become the target of an SFCA. Given that 60 percent of 
Binford shareholders sold during the fraud period and that the increase in value is one 
dollar per share, one would expect that the damages payable to the sellers will total $6 
million. But if the company pays out $6 million in damages, its value is reduced by that 
amount, which in turn causes the market price to drop back from $11, which in turn 
decreases the per share damages. The process repeats itself through a negative feedback 
mechanism. The market price falls a bit less with each iteration. If the market is working 
perfectly, the price will equilibrate at $10.625 per share. What should have been a ten 
percent increase in price will have been muted by normal market mechanisms to become 
a 6.25 percent increase in price because of the prospect of SFCA damages.55 
the funds will be reinvested. Money -- like matter and energy – can neither be created nor destroyed. Thus, 
all awards are ultimately mere rearrangements of wealth. That does not mean, however, that we do not need 
to get it right. Clearly the argument proves too much. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
 
55 For a more detailed derivation of the solution, see the appendix. 
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One can calculate the total percentage increase in market price in a good news 
case using the following formula: 
 
total increase in market value = expected increase / (1 + % of shares 
damaged) 
 
Note that the formula makes it clear that the greater the percentage of shares damaged 
(that is the greater the turnover of different shares), the smaller the total increase in 
market price (and the smaller the aggregate damages or settlement value). The following 
chart sets forth the results for Binford at various levels of turnover. 
 
D.  Why Bad News Cases Predominate 
 
Although it probably goes without saying at this point, the difference between a 
good news case and a bad news case is striking. In the examples – both of which involve 
a hypothetical ten percent change in stock price – the price rises in the good news case by 
only 6.25 percent whereas it falls in the bad news case by 25 percent. Moreover, as the 
number of shares traded increases, the price change becomes ever smaller in the good 
news case and ever larger in the bad news case. In a good news case, the price change 
reaches a limit equal to half of the hypothetical percentage decrease. But in a bad news 
case, there is no downside limit at all. If enough shares trade, the price of the stock will 
fall to zero. The graph depicts the relationship.  
 
GOOD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES 
Assume hypothetical pre-damages increase of $10M: 
 
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $1.67M or $.833/share. 
 
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.86M or $.714/share. 
 
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.33M or $.667/share. 
 
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.75M or $.625/share. 
 
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $4.44M or $.556/share. 
 
If 100% of shares are damaged, total award is $5.00M or $.500/share.* 
* Note that $5M is exactly half of the hypothetical increase. 
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It is thus not at all surprising that bad news cases are far more common than good 
news cases and that cases with long class periods are more serious than those with short 
class periods. The system makes it so. But it makes no sense for the system to be skewed 
in this way. In an efficient market, the chances should be fifty-fifty that the next price 
move will be up or down. One would think that securities law should see a given price 
change in either direction as equally important. But as things stand, the law punishes 
failure to disclose bad news far more severely than failure to disclose good news.56 
IV. ISSUER RECOVERY AND DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 
 
It is easy to fix the feedback problem. Diversified investors can be made whole by 
issuer recovery of insider gains. Consider a case of bad news fraud accompanied by 
 
56 To be sure, investors are said to be risk averse and may thus care more about bad news than good news. 
And the markets have always been skeptical of short sellers. The stock markets (unlike the commodity 
markets) impose restrictions on short selling. Thus, there is some precedent for asymmetric regulation. But 
the rules against short selling are widely criticized as a drag on market efficiency. Moreover, it is unclear 
that these rules have much impact in a market in which options and futures on stocks are readily available. 
One feature that may differentiate stocks from other investments, is that stock prices tend to go up over 
time. Nevertheless, investors generally recognize that there are nearly as many opportunities to make 
money when prices go down as when they go up. In addition, it is not at all clear that stock investors are in 
fact risk averse vis a vis individual stocks. Indeed, a diversified investor is risk neutral (if not risk 
preferring) precisely because of diversification. Thus, a diversified investor is has a strong preference for 
accurate pricing in both directions, and should be opposed to any system that skews access to information 
or the impact of new information.  
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insider selling before disclosure. If the company recovers the insider gains, the value of 
the company is increased by the amount the insider extracted from the market (ignoring 
attorney fees and other costs of recovery) and diversified investors end up precisely 
where they would have ended up in a simple fraud case. The feedback effect does not 
arise, because the recovery goes to the company. Thus, securities fraud actions involving 
insider trading should be litigated in the name of the issuer, either by the issuer directly or 
by means of a derivative action by a stockholder. 
 
This solution does not require any change in statutory law. Rather, actions 
alleging simple securities fraud should be dismissed for failure to allege damages.57 
Actions alleging securities fraud accompanied by insider trading of some variety should 
be classified as derivative rather than direct.58 It is well settled that the question whether 
an action is derivative or direct is one for the court.59 If the real harm from securities 
fraud is akin to insider trading, then it seems clear that the cause of action belongs to the 
company. 60 After all, the offense of insider trading is based first and foremost on the 
 
57 It is important to emphasize that the argument for this fix does not necessarily depend on the assumption 
that all investors are diversified. It is enough that most investors are diversified, or indeed that they are able 
to diversify costlessly. Even in a world of mostly undiversified investors, one might argue that the risk of 
buying or selling at the wrong moment is one that investors willingly assume. The fact that a stock may fall 
or rise abruptly when new information comes to light will inevitably fall somewhere whether or not the 
disclosure is timely. Thus the law might deny recovery to undiversified investors on a theory akin to 
contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Although the due diligence defense under Rule 10b-5 has 
been narrowed in recent years, it is still recognized. See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. 
Angelos, 762 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1985). I do not mean to suggest here that securities fraud actions in which 
there is privity between buyer and seller are abusive or should be curtailed. Indeed, an action by a company 
against an agent who trades on inside information is such an action. Moreover, in such an action the 
allegation is that the defendant traded with the plaintiff on the basis of material non public information and 
that the defendant owed a direct duty to the plaintiff not to do so. 
 
58 In the alternative, all SFCAs could be classified as derivative rather than direct on the theory that the only 
actions that may proceed are derivative actions. It would then be up to the subject company to seek 
dismissal of those cases not involving a duty of loyalty problem such as misappropriation through insider 
trading. It is conceivable also that the subject company might choose to proceed against individuals who 
misled the public on the grounds that the corporation has a state law duty of disclosure. See Malone v. 
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
 
59 See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 2004 Del. LEXIS 161. 
 
60 Both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have recently reiterated that allegations of unusual insider 
trading may constitute evidence of scienter. Levi v. Corning, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5259 (2d Cir.); 
Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, data show that allegations of insider 
trading are not a reliable predictor that an SFCA will survive a motion to dismiss. See A.C. Pritchard &
Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, at 25 (U. Mich. Working Paper #03-011, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=439503. As Pritchard and Sale point out, insider trading 
is a noisy signal. In many companies insiders trade quite frequently, because much of their compensation 
comes in the form of stock options, and when an option is exercised, one must sell at least enough option 
stock to cover the tax due on the gain. Moreover, because insiders are heavily invested in the stock of their 
own companies, they need to diversify. Thus, the courts are quite correct to require a showing of unusual 
insider trading in order to satisfy the requirement that scienter be pleaded with particularity. 
Notwithstanding the fact that unusual insider trading may be evidence thereof, scienter is not the issue for 
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misappropriation of information from the company. And even if one grants that insiders 
also owe a duty to investors not to trade on material non public information, the primary 
duty is one owed to the company.61 
So far, the focus here has been on securities fraud not involving an offering by the 
issuer company. But some SFCAs involve offerings.62 As with securities fraud with 
insider trading, when a company issues stock without disclosing negative material 
information about the company’s business, the company effectively extracts capital from 
the market without giving the market the opportunity to determine a fair price. 
Obviously, if the company has sold stock fraudulently, it makes no sense for the company 
to recover. The appropriate remedy is disgorgement. That is essentially the remedy 
mandated by the 1933 Act. But under the 1933 Act the total award is limited to the 
amount of the offering.63 Accordingly, there is no possibility of feedback in such cases. It 
is quite appropriate in such a case for aggrieved investors -- whether diversified or not -- 
to recover from the company itself. As long as recovery is limited to those investors who 
bought the stock improperly issued by the company, such a remedy has none of the 
untoward consequences of SFCAs based on Rule 10b-5.64 
present purposes. Rather the point here is that plaintiff classes do not suffer harm in the absence of insider 
trading or the equivalent. In other words, the issue here is loss causation. 
 
61 Most commentators who have tackled the anomalies of damages and settlement in connection with 
SFCAs have advocated either a statutory limit on awards or a system of fines. See Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639 (1996). Both such solutions 
would inevitably be somewhat arbitrary. The central reform suggested here -- direct action by aggrieved 
issuers backed up by the threat of a shareholder derivative action -- has the distinct advantage of affording a 
remedy that is both precise and adjustable to the harm. 
 
62 The Thakor study found that 70 of 482 actions studied involved IPOs. See Thakor supra.
63 See Securities Act §11(g); Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
64 To be sure, it is common in an action in connection with an offering also to include a general claim based 
on Rule 10b-5. And except in cases in which the offering is an IPO, it is likely that a class action will be 
filed on behalf of all investors who bought during the fraud period, not just those investors who bought 
stock in the offering. Thus, the number of allegedly damaged shares may exceed the number of shares 
offered. In any event, a Rule 10b-5 claim is superfluous with respect to shares sold by the company as part 
of the offering if the remedy under both is disgorgement and the issuer company is required to disgorge 
under the 1933 Act anyway. If Rule 10b-5 claims are limited to claims in the name of the company to 
recover gains from insider trading, such a claim would be out of place in a case involving an offering, 
unless insiders also engaged in selling previously outstanding shares during the offering. But any such 
claim would arise under the 1934 Act anyway. Thus, assuming that open market securities fraud actions 
under Rule 10b-5 are limited to actions in the name of the company, investors remain fully protected by the 
1933 Act. The 1934 Act adds nothing to a claim involving an offering. The Supreme Court has suggested 
on at least two occasions that the reach of the securities laws should be similarly limited. See Gustafson v. 
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (limiting claims under §12 of the 1933 Act to offerings); Herman & 
McClean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (suggesting under the doctrine of nullification that Rule 10b-
5 should be applied in connection with an offering only if it affords a remedy in addition to the 1933 Act). 
Janet Alexander has suggested that one of the reasons that a stock’s price may crash in a case involving an 
offering is that buyers in an offering obtain what she calls a litigation put that effectively guarantees that 
the company will buy back the stock at the offering price if the price falls because of some failure to 
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Issuer recovery also presents difficulties if the fraud involves the repurchase of
stock by the issuing company. In cases in which a repurchase has the effect of raising 
stock price so that insiders can sell at artificially inflated prices, a derivative action 
against the insiders is a perfectly adequate remedy.65 But suppose that a company issues 
an unduly gloomy press release --depressing its own stock price -- and then proceeds to 
buy back shares.66 It would hardly make sense for the company to recover damages in 
such a case. Indeed, the company would need to sue itself to do so. Even if there is no 
insider trading during the fraud period, insiders may increase their proportionate 
ownership of the company, effectively banking gains for a later day, without ever 
trading.67 And that constitutes an extraction of wealth from the public market.68 
It may be appropriate to permit SFCAs in this one context. If handled properly, 
SFCAs relating to fraudulent repurchases need not give rise to a feedback problem 
because the number of damaged shares and hence aggregate damages can be determined 
with precision. To be specific, the number of damaged shares is the number of shares 
repurchased by the company, and the aggregate damage to the public is that number 
multiplied by the price increase following corrective disclosure (adjusted for dilution).69 
disclose material information. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class 
Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421, 1427 (1994). In other words, the risk of buying stock in an offering at the 
offering price is more or less eliminated by the statutory remedies afforded by the 1933 Act. When a fraud 
occurs, the litigation put effectively expires and ceases to protect subsequent investors from any further 
decline in price. The same is presumably true for all investors when the statute of limitations expires, but 
there is no evidence that the market declines then. Obviously, the litigation put theory can explain a price 
crash only in a case involving an offering (and an IPO at that). Even then, the litigation put affords no 
protection at prices above the offering price even though many investors in the aftermarket pay prices that 
are well above the offering price. And it affords no explanation in connection with an open market case 
arising solely under the 1934 Act. Given that the focus here is on non-1933 Act cases, the litigation put 
does not come into play. Nevertheless, I doubt that the litigation put has independent value from the 
prospect of recovery in a legal action under the 1933 Act once it is filed. In other words, the idea that the 
litigation put has independent value is a result of double counting. 
65 Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
421 (2000).   
A similar problem arises if the company grants options at a time when stock price is artificially depressed. 
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F. 2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968).Cheap options result in the 
extraction of value by the recipients just as if they had engaged in insider trading. Charles M. Yablon & 
Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of 
Misaligned Incentives? 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83 (2000). Again, recovery by the company works just fine 
as a remedy. Moreover, under the Sarbanes Oxley Act insiders must disgorge any gains resulting from the 
effects of false information on market prices even in the absence of fraud. 
 
66 Such cases are presumably rare, because companies have a strong incentive to disclose good news. 
Moreover, the Thakor study found that on balance institutions enjoyed gains in such cases. See Thakor 
supra.
67 See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 Yale L. J. 455 (2003). 
68 See Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-18. 
 
69 As with a 1933 Act case, the damages are limited to the number of shares repurchased by the company. 
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Only those stockholders who sold during the fraud period may recover.70 To be sure, 
there are likely to be many more shares traded during the fraud period than the number 
bought back by the company. Thus, the award to each class member is likely to be quite 
small.71 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The practical question for a court is whether a securities fraud action is direct or 
derivative. The answer depends on whether the harm is primarily to the corporation or to 
individual stockholders and whether recovery should go to the corporation or individual 
stockholders.72 In light of the analysis herein, it seems clear that a securities fraud action 
should be seen as derivative in nature. Assuming that reasonable investors diversify, and 
that federal securities law aims to protect reasonable investors, the only harm that comes 
from securities fraud is the harm that results from insider misappropriation of gain. To be 
sure, that is a harm that is suffered collectively by the stockholders, and not by the 
company itself except in the sense that it affects company reputation. But the harm that 
the stockholders suffer is harm from a general reduction in stock price (however small it 
might be in the absence of an SFCA) that they would suffer equally (again in the absence 
of an SFCA). Harm that affects all stockholders equally by affecting stock price is 
classically derivative.73 Again, whether an action is direct or derivative is a question for 
the court. It is in effect a matter of law – albeit procedural law.74 
70 One might argue that fraudulent repurchase constitutes a direct and non pro rata harm to those 
stockholders who sold their shares back to the company on the cheap and accordingly is an appropriate case 
for a direct action (class action) rather than a derivative action. One might also think of the repurchase as 
rearrangement of wealth within the corporation akin to a recapitalization. 
 
71 Members of the plaintiff class will ordinarily recover more under this measure of aggregate damages than 
they would under the current measure, because feedback in a good news case tends to mute the change in 
market price upon corrective disclosure. 
 
72 In the alternative, some courts have suggested that the answer depends on whether all stockholders have 
suffered the same harm, or if the harm consists in the differential treatment of stockholders of the same 
class. By the same token, one might say that where recovery by the corporation results in equal treatment of 
stockholders, the action should be seen as derivative and not direct.  
 
73 In other words, the argument (for example) that buyers in a bad news case suffer differently from 
holdover stockholders (and sellers) is based in large part on the threat of SFCAs. In the absence of that 
threat, all stockholders (other than sellers who do not really count) would suffer the same harm, whereas 
following recovery from an SFCA buyers are made whole at the expense of holdover stockholders. Thus, 
the different treatment of stockholders is the result of the SFCA. The argument that buyers are different 
because they bought into a sinking ship when holders would have suffered losses anyway ultimately begs 
the question.  
 
74 As noted above, and whether or not the action is classified as direct or derivative, the court must 
determine whether the individual plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class or the corporation as 
the case may be. If rational investors diversify, presumably only a diversified investor can qualify as an 
adequate representative. Moreover, if the argument herein is correct, a diversified representative should be 
opposed to litigating any claim that does not involve insider trading or the equivalent, and would prefer to 
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There are also powerful contextual arguments for the idea that SFCAs should be 
seen as derivative in nature when there is insider trading involved. Congress has 
explicitly endorsed recovery by the company – and by derivative action when necessary – 
in Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. That section famously creates a bright line rule 
requiring insiders to disgorge to the company any gain from short swing trading. 
Specifically, Section 16 applies to officers, directors, and ten percent stockholders of 
1934 Act registered companies and provides that any profit (or loss avoided) from the 
purchase and sale or sale and purchase of equity securities may be recovered by the 
issuing company. Further, Section 16(b) explicitly creates a right of action in the name of 
the issuer and provides that if the issuer fails to bring suit within 60 days of a demand by 
a stockholder, the stockholder may recover on behalf of the issuer. Although Section 16 
is largely dismissed these days as an outdated notion of what constitutes insider trading 
(and a trap for the unwary), it is nonetheless a clear statement by Congress that the issuer 
should recover.75 
In addition, it is arguable that SFCAs enhance damages artificially through 
feedback (in bad news cases) and that the feedback portion of damages is in excess of 
actual damages. Thus, it is also arguable that Section 28 of the 1934 Act, which provides 
that recovery under the act is limited to recovery of actual damages, dictates that SFCAs 
be recast as derivative.76 In other words, given that SFCAs have the effect of magnifying 
the harm, it follows that investors may only recover amounts misappropriated by insiders 
if any.77 
litigate those claims as derivative claims. Thus, it would seem that one way to implement the solution 
proposed here is to make it part of the review of plaintiff adequacy under FRCP 23 and FRCP 23.1. 
 
75 It is curious that up to now this provision has not inclined anyone to argue that SFCAs should be 
prosecuted by the issuer or derivatively. Of course, the argument would depend on the willingness of 
issuers to prosecute such actions. Thus, it is perhaps understandable that issuers have chosen to fight rather 
than switch. But as I have shown here, the SFCA alternative is more odious. It is also arguable that the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (with its emphasis on internal controls) expresses a Congressional preference for such 
an approach. 
 
76 Some legal scholars have argued that the price effect of litigation may be regarded as consequential 
damages that are a proximate result of the fraud. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price 
Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7 (1994). See also 
Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1421 
(1994). The implication is that crash damages ought to be cognizable and compensable. To the contrary, 
my argument here is that such damages are a cost of a system that relies on SFCAs. Although one might be 
tempted to argue that plaintiff attorney fees also contribute to excess price decline, fees are paid out of the 
award. They reduce the payment per share to class members, but they do not directly increase the payout by 
the company. On the other hand, generous attorney fees do effectively insure that SFCAs will be filed. 
 
77 It is also worth noting that a derivative action is presumably cheaper to prosecute than is a class action, 
which involves identification of and notice to all class members. Moreover, a derivative action effectively 
represents all of the stockholders rather than only those who traded during the fraud period, and if the 
action is successful, the company pays the attorney fees based on the benefit to the company which may 
arguably exceed the monetary recovery. Thus, there remains a substantial incentive for the plaintiff bar to 
prosecute such actions. 
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Admittedly, it is also arguable that Congress has recognized by statute that 
securities fraud is direct in nature. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) both seem 
to recognize that a class action is the appropriate procedure for securities fraud by virtue 
of numerous provisions that address how SFCAs should be conducted. But one might 
also argue that these acts simply acknowledge that SFCAs exist.78 In addition, one might 
argue that in the Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) 
Congress recognized an individual cause of action for insider trading. But that does not 
mean that the company has somehow lost its right to enforce fiduciary duties owed to it 
by its agents.79 Indeed, the primary legal theory upon which insider trading is deemed to 
be an actionable wrong is misappropriation.80 Moreover, the courts have held that a 
stockholder has no right to assert a misappropriation claim directly.81 
78 It is ironic that when Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) in 
response to the migration of SFCAs to state court after PSLRA, a provision known as the Delaware Carve 
Out (DCO) was included to preserve the traditional jurisdiction of state courts over stockholder derivative 
actions. The suggestion here is that most SFCAs should in fact be litigated as derivative actions. Thus, 
under the DCO, such actions may be brought in state court after all even though SLUSA was clearly 
intended to preempt state law actions based on theories of nondisclosure as opposed to fiduciary duty. Of 
course, it is also possible to pursue a derivative action in federal court. Indeed, if the action is ultimately 
based on a Rule 10b-5 claim asserted by the company, it must be litigated in federal court. But the strongest 
claim will often be one based on common law agency principles. Treating SFCAs as derivative actions 
would also have the salutary effect of eliminating the problem of determining the number of damaged 
shares represented by the plaintiff class. This problem has proved to be utterly intractable and has given 
rise to dubious statistical models that purport to estimate total damages in SFCAs. (Indeed, this article 
started out as a one addressed to that subject.) To be sure, only shareholders who are shareholders at the 
time of the wrong and who remain shareholders have standing to sue. Thus, it might be argued that no one 
would have standing (or motivation) to sue in a case of good news fraud. Although such cases are much 
less common than bad news cases and thus are less worrisome, it quite seems likely that the plaintiff bar 
will rise to the challenge. After all, holdover shareholders have standing to sue derivatively and can argue 
that the company should recoup any illicit gains of its agents. Thus, there is no real contemporaneous 
ownership problem. And again, selling stockholders are ultimately protected by diversification. That is, 
they will sometimes gain from windfall awards in good news cases. Finally, one should not dismiss the 
possibility that publicly traded companies might become quite aggressive about policing insider trading if 
the collateral damage from doing so were not as devastating as it is under the current system. Cf. Carpenter 
v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). On the other hand, there is some chance that the courts might dismiss 
a derivative action if it appears that too many shares have traded during the fraud period. See Bangor Punta 
Operations v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974). One would hope not in that diversified 
investors will depend on recovery in as many meritorious cases as possible whether or not they were a 
stockholder at the time of the fraud. 
 
79 Moreover, ITSFEA limits individual recovery for insider trading to the profits of the insiders who traded, 
net of any other recovery including presumably a recovery by the company. One might even argue that 
SFCAs are a roundabout way of avoiding this express limitation on recovery. It is worth noting that 
ITSFEA does not apply to the issuer company which would not be limited to recovery of the insider gains, 
but might seek compensation for consequential harm. 
 
80 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). It may also be possible for a company to limit a 
stockholder's right to sue directly by an appropriate provision in its articles of incorporation. 
 
81 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). One might also argue from Blue Chip 
Stamps, that only traders have standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 and that a derivative action effectively 
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VI. THEORETICAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The analysis of SFCAs herein assumes (1) that insider trading is a bad thing and 
(2) that inside stockholders and outside stockholders should be seen as two distinct 
groups with interests that may conflict. Neither of these assertions is non-controversial. 
 
Again, diversified stockholders are indifferent to simple securities fraud but not to 
fraud with insider trading. It may be a bit too strong to say that the argument assumes that 
insider trading is a bad thing. The argument is simply that diversified public investors 
suffer no reduction in aggregate wealth from securities fraud unless it is accompanied by 
insider trading or the equivalent. Accordingly, these are the only cases in which 
diversified stockholders would favor a remedy. 
 
The assumption that insider trading is a bad thing will not bother most readers. 
But some legal scholars have argued that insider trading should not be illegal and may 
even be beneficial.82 Moreover, if one thinks of the market as including both insiders and 
outsiders, then there is no net effect on aggregate stockholder wealth. If so, all SFCAs 
should be dismissed outright. Thus, only if one thinks of these two groups of stockholders 
as having somewhat adverse interests is there any basis for SFCAs.83 But if they do have 
 
permits non trading holdover stockholders to gain the benefits of a securities fraud action. It is well settled, 
however, that Rule 10b-5 will support a derivative action for example where a corporation is harmed by 
one of its agents through trading in securities. To be sure, in most SFCAs other than those involving stock 
options, the corporation itself will not have traded in its own stock. But in O’Hagan the Supreme Court 
held that the misappropriation of business information for purposes of insider trading is a sufficient nexus 
to support a cognizable breach of duty to the corporation under Rule 10b-5. In other words, O’Hagan 
would seem to limit the applicability of Blue Chip Stamps where the issuer corporation is the plaintiff in an 
insider trading case. Moreover, in Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized a fiduciary duty of timely disclosure for the benefit of traders and non traders alike, which 
would seem to support the idea that a non trading stockholder has standing to maintain a derivative action 
based on Rule 10b-5. And even if it does not support a federal action, it clearly supports a state law 
derivative action by which stockholders may be made whole. Finally, it is well settled that a principal need 
not plead or prove loss in order to recover for a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent (as in connection with 
recovery of secret profits obtained by an agent). See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 402 – 404; Cede 
& Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). But see Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 
1156 (Del. 1995). Notwithstanding the recent development of state law relating to disclosure, it might be 
argued that in spirit SLUSA requires all actions based on some claim of non-disclosure, should be litigated 
in federal court. See In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation (Janus Subtrack) (MDL 1586), 384 
F.Supp.2d 873 (D. Md. 2005). Indeed, one might argue as much from the fact that federal jurisdiction is 
exclusive under the 1934 Act. In any case, it matters little for present purposes whether the claim would be 
litigated in federal or state court. All that matters is that it be litigated as a derivative claim. 
 
82 See Henry G. Manne, Options? Nah. Try Insider Trading., Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2002 at A8; 
Richard A. Booth, Insider Trading, Better Markets, Wall St. J., June 28, 1991 at A12. 
 
83 It well recognized that various classes of security holders and even stockholders may have interests that 
conflict with each other. Indeed, most cases involving the rights of preferred stockholders and bondholders 
are based on such conflicts. Moreover, the courts have recognized that interests may conflict within a class 
and that a court may consider such conflicts when appropriate. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General 
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). On the other hand, the courts have also recognized that the corporation 
is free within a broad range of action to manipulate finances in favor of the common stockholders. 
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somewhat adverse interests, it seems to follow that insider trading should be legally 
cognizable.84 
The argument that all stockholders -- inside and outside -- should be viewed as 
one big happy family with congruent interests clearly proves too much. Few if any would 
question the policy behind the 1933 Act that offerings under false pretenses designed to 
gain access public capital should be prohibited (even if one has quibbles with the details 
of how the act works). In other words, although one might argue that a fraudulent stock 
offering is ultimately nothing more than a rearrangement of wealth among investors, it is 
a rearrangement that we choose to prohibit. 
 
Moreover, even those scholars who do not see intrinsic harm in insider trading 
will likely acknowledge that there may be subtle dangers. Insiders may withhold 
information in order to make time to execute trades. Or the company may even choose to 
go public in order to create opportunities for insider trading. Thus, it seems that the 
debate about whether insider trading is in fact harmful relates primarily to those trades 
that do not involve intentional withholding of information from the market. 
 
One standard argument against the illegality of insider trading is that it seems to 
be a victimless wrong. Unsuspecting investors who take the other side of a trade based on 
inside information, presumably would have traded anyway, and would have lost what 
they lost whether or not an insider had been in the market. Moreover, even if one could 
identify those particular investors who took the other side of the trade, it is unclear that 
they should be favored with a recovery when others were in the market at the same time. 
But if the recovery is distributed among all contemporaneous outside traders (as it is 
under current law), the amount that would be recovered by each outsider would likely be 
de minimis. 
One obvious response is that the insider who is in the market because of inside 
information adds to the trading volume and thus is responsible for some small increase in 
volume. (Specialists and market makers will always be there to accommodate these 
trades.) But that does not avoid the problem of how to distribute the recovery and 
whether it is worth the candle. To be sure, the deterrent effect may be more important 
than positive recovery. But deterrence is difficult to measure, particularly if one is 
concerned with the value of cases in which there is no intentional withholding of material 
information. 
 
Arguably, the debate about the harm from insider trading would likely be mooted 
by treating SFCAs as derivative in nature. Simply stated, if insider trading is seen as a 
claim belonging to the corporation, most of the problems that arise from the private 
 
84 Stockholders could in theory waive any claim in connection with insider trading, for example, by means 
of a provision in the articles of incorporation adopted prior to a public offering. But it does not seem that 
any company has ever attempted to do so. And it is unclear that a company that did do so would ever be 
able to sell its stock. 
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prosecution of such claims magically disappear. Specifically, if the corporation recovers 
the ill gotten gains of its faithless agents, the value of the corporation and its stock should 
increase by just enough to compensate for the harm to public investors. Moreover, the 
recovery would automatically be spread over all the stockholders.85 
Whether or not one questions the wisdom of deeming insider trading to be illegal, 
it is quite clear that it is and that the legal foundation for that conclusion is solid. 
 
First, it is clear that directors, officers, major stockholders, and indeed employees 
owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. And it is well established that that duty extends 
to self-dealing, appropriation of opportunities, and competition with the corporation, any 
one of which may comprehend insider trading.86 It is well recognized that insider trading 
may be a violation of fiduciary duty.87 
Second, even in the absence of fiduciary duty, it is clear that corporation law 
presumes that each stockholder of a given class is entitled to equal financial rights unless 
the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.88 
Third, it is clear that any compensation paid to insiders must be authorized by the 
board of directors or an agent to which it has delegated that authority.89 
Fourth, the use of inside information for profit and without permission may 
constitute an independent wrong under mail and wire fraud laws.90 
Fifth, stock exchange rules also prohibit insider trading. Moreover, stock 
exchange rules now generally require stockholder approval of equity compensation.91 
These rules may be seen as an implicit part of the contract with stockholders or as a 
warranty as to the package of rights carried by a share of stock. 
 
85 Admittedly, in a good news case, those who sold would not share in the recovery. But the forces of 
diversification would make them whole over time. 
 
86 See ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.04. 
 
87 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y. 2d 494 (1969); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del.Ch. 241 
(1949). But see Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom., Lehman 
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), on certification, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla.1975); Freeman v. Decio, 584 
F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 
88 See MBCA 6.01. The same goes for the rights of partners as between each other. See UPA § 18; RUPA § 
401. 
 
89 See ALI Principles of Corporate Governance §5.03. 
 
90 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 
91 See SEC Assents To Shareholders' Right To Rule On Equity Compensation Plans, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA), July 7, 2003 at 1103. 
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Sixth, Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act provides that the corporation has a right 
of action against an insider in connection with short swing trading.92 By analogy, the 
corporation should have a similar right in connection with other forms of insider trading. 
 
Although the foregoing arguments suggest that insider trading must be seen as 
illegal, none quite answers the question whether insider trading is intrinsically wrong. It 
is not clear that the question has -- or needs -- an answer, because it is quite clear that all 
investors (both diversified and undiversified) will favor a rule that prohibits the secret 
reduction of their returns.93 Clearly, a company may adopt an internal rule providing that 
information obtained in the course of business is deemed to be a company asset for 
business use only. Indeed, it seems likely that in the absence of some sort of waiver, the 
law would presume as much as it currently stands. Such a rule presumably increases trust 
in the market and keeps stock prices higher for all than they otherwise would be in the 
absence of such a rule. In other words, insider trading has social costs that can easily be 
avoided by imposing a rule that investors might not be able to negotiate on their own. 
And that is a pretty good rationale for a legal rule.94 
In addition, it may matter why companies go public. Although the conventional 
view is that companies go public to raise capital in order to grow, there are other reasons 
that may be even more important. Companies also go public in order to create a liquid 
market for their stock with continuous pricing. That also permits the use of equity 
compensation (such as stock options) and permits insiders to gain diversification. The use 
of equity compensation in turn entails active management of float through repurchases. 
Under the conventional view, once a company goes public, trading is of little direct 
moment to the company. Traders may trade all they want, but the company has its 
money. What the market thinks matters little. Under the expanded view, the company 
cares very much about the market, because the market is the gateway to liquidity and 
diversification. Going public is merely a first step in creating a market that permits the 
company to sell (and buy) stock more or less on demand. To be blunt, insiders need the 
market so they can bail out at will. 
 
Although many might at first espouse the conventional view that the primary 
purpose of going public is to raise money, it is clear that insiders continue to care about 
the market despite the fact that the proceeds of the offering are long since in the bank. 
And it is not simply because they fear the wrath of the SEC if they fail to serve the 
stockholders. Thus, it seems quite clear that for a seasoned company with no particular 
plan to return to the market, there is more to being publicly traded than the occasional 
stock offering. Indeed, in most years, publicly traded companies buy back more stock 
than is offered to the public.95 The SEC has acknowledged the other functions of being 
 
92 15 USC § 78p(b). 
 
93 This probably explains why compensatory stock options have become so controversial. 
 
94 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
 
95 See Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 1995-2003, December 9, 2004, 
Table F213. 
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publicly traded by adopting a series of rules over the last twenty years designed to 
facilitate active participation in the market by issuers and insiders.96 In short, going 
public and being public may be more about having the company stock publicly traded 
than it is about the cash. If so, there is every reason to worry about unauthorized access to 
the market by insiders. In other words, insider trading may be all about the inherent 
conflict between diversified and undiversified investors. 
 
Finally, one obvious response to the idea that securities fraud and insider trading 
should be pursued derivatively is that corporations are likely to seek dismissal of such 
claims as against the best interests of the corporation, a tactic that is unavailable in 
connection with a class action. To be sure, corporations have a good deal of control over 
derivative actions. But many companies may be deterred from pursuing claims against 
their own agents because of the in terrorem effect of SFCAs. In short, the present cure is 
so much worse than the disease that no sane company would ever pursue such claims on 
its own. Indeed, it is not too strong to say that the current system of enforcement by 
SFCA effectively precludes any effective form of self-policing.Treating securities fraud 
as a claim belonging to the company would eliminate the devastating collateral 
consequences of SFCAs which constitute a significant impediment to self policing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Securities fraud class actions do far more harm than good. Indeed, when one 
considers the effects of diversification, it does not appear that anyone other than the 
lawyers gain from private securities litigation. Diversified buyers, sellers, and traders 
should be indifferent to securities fraud except to the extent that it is accompanied by 
insider trading. But because both defendant companies and long-term stockholders 
always pay, they cannot avoid the risk of securities fraud through diversification. In short, 
private securities litigation creates significant costs but no identifiable benefits. This is 
not a case in which the cure is worse than the disease. The cure is the disease. The simple 
solution is to view securities fraud (other than in connection with an offering) as a cause 
of action belonging to the issuer and accordingly to view a stockholder action as 
derivative in character. First do no harm. 
 
96 See, e.g., Securities Act Rule 415 (shelf registration and continuous offerings); Exchange Act Rule 10b-
18 (safe harbor for open market repurchases); Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1 (safe harbor for insider sales 
pursuant to plan explicitly citing insider diversification as rationale). 
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APPENDIX 
 
DERIVATION OF FORMULAS 
 
BAD NEWS CASE 
 
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares)                         $100M = 10/share 
 
POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE                                           90M = 9/share 
 
DAMAGES TO BUYERS (60% turnover)                                          6M = .60/share 
 
NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative)                                           90M  6M = 84M = 8.40/share 
 
But if market value post is 84M, then damages should be 16M x .60 = 9.6M. 
Now market value post is 90M less 9.6M = 81.4M = 8.14/share. 
Process repeats to limit of $15M in total damages to buyers. 
 
DAMAGES TO BUYERS                                                   15M / 600K shares = $2.50/share 
 
NET TO HOLDERS                                                     90M  15M = 75M = $7.50/share 
 
NET TO BUYERS                                                           $7.50/share plus $2.50/share 
 
GENERAL RULE FOR BAD NEWS CASES: 
 
total decrease in market value = theoretical decrease / (1 - % of shares damaged) 
GOOD NEWS CASE 
 
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares)                                   $100M  = 10/share 
 
POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE                           110M  = 11/share 
 
DAMAGES TO SELLERS (60% turnover)                                         6M  = .60/share 
 
NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative)                                     110M – 6M = 104M = 10.40/share 
 
But if market value post is 104M, then damages should be 4M x .60 = 2.40M. 
Now market value post is 110M less 2.4M = 107.6M = 10.76/share. 
Process repeats to limit of 3.75M in total damages to sellers. 
 
DAMAGES TO SELLERS                                                           3.75M / 600K shares = .625/share 
 
NET TO HOLDERS                                                   110M  3.75M = 106.25M = 10.625/share 
 
GROSS TO SELLERS                                                           10/share + .625/share = 10.625/share 
 
GENERAL RULE FOR GOOD NEWS CASES: 
 
total increase in market value =  theoretical increase / (1 + % of shares damaged) 
